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Economic and Social Trends
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Giovanni M. Carbone
Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa is arguably the fastest-changing region in the world. It is a composite area, 
with a land mass larger than China, the US and the European Union combined. It comprises 
over 900 million people fragmented in 49 nation states and several hundred ethnic groups. Africa 
hosts the poorest populations in the world alongside South Africa, an economy with some highly-
advanced sectors where heart transplants were pioneered some fifty years ago.
As diverse as the region is, its economies and societies feature also a number of shared traits 
and developments. The broad picture shows a subcontinent that is undergoing major social, 
economic and political transformations. This paper focuses on two key dimensions of change, 
namely the area’s sustained economic expansion and its massive demographic growth, and also 
briefly points to two more specific phenomena, namely Africans’ new “connectedness”, among 
themselves and towards the outside world, and the forceful rise of Nigeria. It concludes that 
the fast transformations the region is undergoing raise several challenges that are of inescapable 
concern for the international community as well as actors specifically involved with the area.
Africa’s new economic season
At less than $2,700 per capita income (PPP), Africa1 remains the poorest region in the world. 
In spite of positive expectations and of relatively favourable beginnings during the 1960s, the 
region’s newly-independent states had become a synonym for failed development over the 1970s 
and 1980s. Not only industrialisation strategies proved unsuccessful, but overall agricultural 
production declined as well. By 1994, Africans’ average income – a mere $744 – was back at its 
1968 level2. Most of the continent remained trapped in underdevelopment and poverty, often 
compounded by authoritarian rule, political instability and violence.
Things began to change just prior to the turn of the century, as annual growth in sub-Saharan Africa 
sped up from 0.8% in 1990-1994 to 3.5% in 1995-1999. Rates further rose to a 5.4% average between 
2000 and 2013, and talk began of an African economic boom (Figure 1). Economic performance 
1  Unless otherwise specified, the paper uses the term “Africa” interchangeably with “sub-Saharan Africa”
2  World Bank online databank, World Development Indicators, April 2014.
* Giovanni M. Carbone is associate professor of Political Science at the University of Milan.
Flexible Frameworks
Beyond Borders 79
remains robust, driven by agricultural production and investments in natural resources and 
infrastructures, with estimates for 2014-2019 projecting a 5.5% annual average growth. Large 
increases in external trade, foreign direct investments, development aid, migrants’ remittances, 
infrastructure investments and consumer spending have accompanied and sustained the region’s 
growth process.3 The size of Africa’s markets and middle classes has expanded significantly.
The roots of Africa’s current economic renaissance lie in favourable international commodity 
prices (particularly for mineral exports), economic reforms and better management (initiated by 
the tough structural adjustment programmes that donors forced upon sub-Saharan governments 
since the 1980s), political governance reforms and stabilisation (a result of both domestic demands 
for ending maladministration and post-Cold war foreign pressures), and external support in the 
form of debt cancellation and increases in development aid.
The continent’s wealth of natural resources played an important role. In terms of shares of sub-
Saharan Africa’s GDP, the weight of natural resources increased the most, up from 13.4% in 2000 
to 18.1% in 2011, followed by the service sector, which also expanded significantly from 54.2% 
to 58.0%. Agriculture, on the other hand, was slimmed down from 16.3% to 12.1%.4 The fact that 
manufacturing also declined from 14.9% to 11.8% is a sign that the continent struggles to turn the 
gains of economic growth into structural changes. Africa’s growth, in particular, has so far created 
few jobs. 
Contrary to a commonly-held opinion, however, growth has not been limited to countries rich 
in natural resources (Figure 2). Resource-poor countries not only marginally outperformed 
resource-rich countries during the early phases of economic renaissance (3.1% as against 2.9% 
annual average growth during the 1990s), but also strengthened their advances in subsequent 
years (4.0% in 2000-2012). As many as 8 of Africa’s 12 fastest-growing economies during 1995-
2010 were countries poor in natural resources, or at least countries in which the exploitation of 
natural resources was yet to play a prominent role, including Ethiopia, Mozambique, Burkina 
Faso, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania.5
3  Giovanni Carbone, Gianpaolo Bruno, Gian Paolo Calchi Novati, Marta Montanini, “Scommettere 
sull’Africa emergente. Opportunità e scenari della presenza italiana nell’Africa subsahariana,” Milano, ISPI, 2013
4  Ernst & Young, “Africa attractiveness survey 2013,” 2013, p.17
5  International Monetary Fund, “Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: keeping the pace,” 
Washington, 2013, p.31; and The Economist, “No need to dig”, 2 November 2013
Figure 1: Real GDP growth (% change), 1990-2019
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More generally, vast differences remain among the region’s economies. As Figure 3 shows, sub-
Saharan economies are not only very diverse in terms of size (Nigeria, South Africa and Angola 
topping the ranking) and per capita income (Equatorial Guinea’s is about one hundred times 
that of Burundi), but the extent of variation in their sectorial diversification (as proxied by the 
quota of manufacturing and services over GDP) and export orientation (as proxied by the value 
of per capita exports) also loom large. Based on the latter two dimensions, four groupings can 
be identified that summarize these differences, namely: a number of oil exporters (from Gabon 
to Angola), a few diversified economies (South Africa, some of its neighbours, and a few small 
island economies), the expanding collection of transition economies (from Zambia to Ivory Coast 
or Senegal) and the remaining pre-transition countries (including some of the poorest states in the 
world, such as Burundi, the Congo-DRC, Niger and Liberia).
While structural transformations remain limited, the recent positive economic trend brought 
about significant poverty alleviation. As the share of people living with less than $1.25 a day at 
PPP, absolute poverty south of the Sahara declined from 58.0% in 1999 to 48.5% in 2010 (Figure 4), 
Figure 2: Growth and natural resources (average annual % change of GDP), 1990-1999 
and 2000-2012
Figure 3: Structure of the economy and development trajectories, 2011
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with further decreases projected over the years to come, a noteworthy change from the 1980s and 
early 1990s.6 Yet, the number of people who remain ‘stuck’ under the international poverty line 
has increased from 376 million in 1999 to 413 million in 2010. Compared to faster progress in other 
developing areas, turning Africa’s growth into poverty reduction has been held up by the region’s 
high inequality levels, by the concentration of the benefits of mineral wealth, and by the slow pace 
of agricultural advancements.7
According to some estimates, inequality in Africa has also been declining since the 1990s, reversing 
the increases of the 1970s and 1980s.8 Yet inequality does remain a major concern and an obstacle 
to faster growth. Sub-Saharan African countries have an average Gini index of income distribution 
of 45.1 (26 of them, or a majority, with a Gini of 40 or more, including the likes of South Africa, 
Angola, Zambia or Mozambique), second only to Latin America’s 50.19. High inequality means 
that a large number of people have little or no access to assets (such as education, land, credit, etc.) 
that would allow them to better benefit from the opportunities generated by economic growth. 
Inequality thus strongly hinders the impact of growth on poverty reduction and the contribution 
of the poor to furthering economic expansion. This again calls for more inclusive growth. 
6  World Bank, Africa’s pulse. An analysis of issues shaping Africa’s economic future, Vol. 8, Washington, 
October 2013, p. 14
7  Ibid., pp.14-15
8  Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, “African poverty is falling ... much faster than you think!,” 
NBER Working Paper 15775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge (MA), 2010
9  A World Bank study also points out that, “taking into account that Latin America’s Gini coefficients are 
largely based on income distributions which are typically more unequal than distributions of consumption and 
which form the basis for Africa’s Ginis, inequality in Africa appears not so different from that in Latin America” 
(World Bank 2013, pp.25-26).
Fig. 4. African poverty by 2030. Three scenarios.
Source: World Bank, Africa’s pulse. An analysis of issues shaping Africa’s economic future, Vol. 
8, Washington, October 2013, p. 17
289.7 330.0 349.4 376.8 390.2 394.8 399.3 413.7
56.5
59.4 58.1 58.0
55.7
52.3
49.2 48.5
29.9
26.4
16.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
$1
.2
5-
da
y 
he
ad
co
un
t %
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
N
um
be
r o
f p
oo
r (
m
il.
)
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
82 Flexible FrameworksBeyond Borders
Demographic changes and related challenges
Population growth
Sub-Saharan Africa has historically displayed comparatively low levels of population and po-
pulation density. The subcontinent, however, is in the middle of a phase of huge demographic 
expansion. Since 1950, its population has more than quadrupled, growing from 179 million to 831 
in 2010 (1 billion for Africa as a whole, when North Africa is included). Over the same period, 
the region also overtook Europe in terms of population density – 34 vs. 32 inhabitants per square 
kilometre – although it remains far behind Asia (131).
According to UN projections, the course of the XXI century will mark the rise of Africa as a major 
demographic power10. In fact, it is Africa’s further, dramatic population increases that will drive 
the world’s population growth dynamics over the current century11. The population in the sub-
continent is currently growing at an annual 2.65% rate, compared to Asia’s 1.03% and Europe’s 
0.08%. The number of Africans is set to skyrocket and will reach 3.8 billion by 2100, approaching 
the size of Asia, whose demographic expansion will plateau in about fifty years and then start 
declining towards a projected 4.7 billion (Figure 5). In the space of one hundred years, Africa will 
have grown fivefold.
Two key factors are behind these projections. The first is a marked increase in life expectancy. 
Life in 2100 will be some 40% longer for the average African than it is today – up from 56 years 
in 2010-2015 to 77 years in 2095-2100 – narrowing the gap with the developed regions, for which 
life expectancy will increase from 78 to 89 years. Secondly, Africa’s birth rates are notoriously high 
and will remain so for some time. Between 2010 and 2015 sub-Saharan Africa’s average fertility 
rate was 5.1 children per woman, down from 6.8 in the late 1970s but still more than twice Asia’s 
2.2. Fertility rates will only reach below 3 children per woman after 2055, and only at the end of 
10  Data in this paragraph are from the UN Population Division online database (accessed April 2014).
11  Max Fisher, “The amazing, surprising, Africa-driven demographic future of the earth, in 9 charts”, The 
Washington Post, 16 July 2013.  
Figure 5 : Population projections, 1950-2100
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the century they will essentially align with world and developed regions averages at around 2.0 
children per woman. The continent’s trend towards a sustained demographic expansion, in other 
words, results from the “striking contrast” between its rapid health improvements – leading to 
sharp declines in mortality rates, particularly for children – and a slow reduction in fertility rates 
(May 2014).
This kind of dynamic has important implications in terms of Africa’s chances of capitalising from 
the so-called demographic dividend, or the advantages associated with an expanding workforce 
and a declining number of dependents. Africa’s current dependency ratio – i.e. the ratio of depen-
dents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) per 100 working-age population (people of 15 to 
64 years of age) – is about 85, implying that there is almost one non-working dependent for every 
working person on the continent (Figure 6). This is essentially the result of a large number of un-
der-15. The completion of the continent’s demographic transition requires fertility rates (and thus 
the number of young dependants in need of being fed and looked after) to fall and the labour force 
to expand. Africa’s fertility rates and dependency ratios are already going down, as pointed out, 
but not very fast. As the slowdown combines with entry of younger generations into the workfor-
ce, the dependency ratio will fall below 70 by 2040 and below 60 by 2060: a growing advantage at 
a time when an ageing population will increase Europe’s ratio to about 76 and China’s to 75. 
Yet, whether a similar dynamic will allow African states to actually reap the benefits of a demo-
graphic dividend or, on the contrary, open the way to Malthusian scenarios remains an open 
question. Population growth of this scale will unquestionably raise crucial social, political and 
economic challenges, affecting both life on the continent as well as this latter’s relations with 
outside states. Sub-Saharan governments will have to manage massive and fast-growing young 
generations whose aspirations, when not met by expanding educational and job opportunities 
and rising living standards, may turn against the political, social and economic establishment, as 
recently reminded us by the Arab Spring up north.
Figure 6: Dependency ratios, 1950-2100
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Urbanisation
Vast urbanisation processes go hand in hand with the current demographic and economic growth 
trends. The share of Africa’s population that lives in urban centres has reached 36.8%, up from 
27.9% in 1990.12 Combined with population growth, this implies that cities such as Johannesburg, 
Lagos, Nairobi or Kinshasa have to cope with large new settlements set up by millions of new 
urban immigrants. More broadly, large urban agglomerates are emerging in all corners of the 
continent. Africa reached in 2010 the same number of cities with at least 1 million inhabitants as 
Europe, i.e. fifty-two. The larger these agglomerates, and the faster they expand, the harder the 
challenges of providing adequate security, housing and services to their populations. Concentra-
tions of population and mobilization opportunities imply that fast urbanization can also make 
social conflicts more likely.
Land 
Rural areas are also affected by rapid demographic increases. Land remains a key source of live-
lihood for a majority of Africans. While Africa is home to 50% of the world’s uncultivated arable 
land (or 202 million hectares, from Kenya or Tanzania to Ivory Coast or Angola)13 and is thus a 
region with a huge potential for agricultural expansion, population pressures have traditionally 
raised tensions over land issues, including land and water use and land tenure systems. Local con-
flicts between farmers and herders and/or between ethnic communities (at times compounded by 
inflows of immigrants or refugees), for example, have emerged in countries as diverse as Liberia, 
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Congo-Kinshasa. 
Environmental or climate changes also contribute to the picture, as soil erosion and degradation 
(i.e. the physical, chemical and biological deterioration of soil quality, implying fertility loss) and 
desertification threaten the livelihoods of many rural Africans, particularly those living in dry lan-
ds, often forcing small-scale farmers to displace or migrate, destabilizing their communities and 
encouraging conflicts over water and land use, as in Mali, Darfur or Chad.14 Adding up to recur-
ring droughts, for example, deforestation and inappropriate land management have contributed 
to the surface of Lake Chad shrinking from 23,000 sq.km to about a tenth of it.
Finally, over the past decade, so-called “land grabbing” – i.e. large-scale land acquisitions on the 
part of corporations or sovereign funds from advanced or emerging countries – added a new form 
of pressure. Such acquisitions not only force local farmers and pastoralists from the land, depri-
ving them of their main source of livelihood, but they are aimed at biofuels or food productions 
for faraway markets, thus reducing the overall availability of food for local consumption and 
markets and further increasing food insecurity and occasional instability.15
Food security
In spite of an abundance of land and water, Africa has long lacked food security (i.e. food avai-
lability and accessibility), the result of an underdeveloped agriculture as well as of the impact of 
natural disasters – such as the dramatic 2011 drought in the Horn – and man-made instability – 
12  World Development Indicators, online database, April 2014.
13  World Bank, Securing Africa’s land for shared prosperity, Washington, World Bank, 2013, p. xv. Cf. McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2010, p.59.
14  United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, “Desertification. The invisible frontline,” 
UNCCD, 2014
15  Kai M. Thaler, “Large-scale land acquisitions and social conflict in Africa: analysis and issues with cross-
national land grab data,” Department of Government, Harvard University, April 2014 (working paper)
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such as the 2012 crisis in the Sahel. The continent has received food aid since the 1950s, and food 
emergencies tripled in the 1980s.16 While the reduction of hunger, between 1990 and 2012, led to 
an overall improvement in food security, Africa remains a net food importer. The 2008 spikes in 
food prices led to riots in a number of sub-Saharan countries and food insecurity is a prominent 
issue in places such as Eritrea, Burundi, Ethiopia (in spite of major progress), Chad or the CAR.17 
Addressing food needs and food crises is a key aim of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural De-
velopment Programme (CAADP) established by the African Union in 2003, which, among other 
things, commits regional governments to devote 10% of their budgets to investments in agricultu-
re. To address the issue, the G8 also launched an Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in 2012.
Migration
Strong population growth and poor living conditions contribute to migration patterns. While Afri-
ca retains a comparatively low migration rate (i.e. the ratio of emigrants to the total population of 
the country of origin, or 2.5% for the sub-Saharan region in 2010), more and more Africans have 
left their home countries over recent decades. Contrary to North Africans, however, some 65% of 
sub-Saharan migrants go to other African countries – often neighbouring countries – largely due 
to a lack of financial or educational resources. This is the largest intra-continental movement of 
people in the world. Still, demand and supply of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to advanced 
economies remain strong, favouring human trafficking networks and the related dangers. A signi-
ficant part of emigrants leave their home country due to political instability or natural disasters, 
causing high volatility in each country’s migration rates18. While pressures for Africans to emigra-
te towards high income countries will remain high in the foreseeable future, it will ultimately be 
the continent’s own development processes, and in particular the expansion of job opportunities, 
that will determine the extent of migrations in the years to come.
Africans’ growing connectedness
Part of the development and globalization processes that Africa south of the Sahara is currently 
experiencing reflects in the growing “connectedness” of Africans, both among themselves as well 
as towards the outside world. Opportunities for individual-to-individual interactions, citizen-sta-
te exchanges, regional-level networks and extra-African relationships have all been expanding. 
A recently-published global connectedness index, for example, points that sub-Saharan countries 
registered the largest increases in global connectedness, primarily driven by trade and informa-
tion flows.19
According to a long-predominant narrative, after independence Africans were gradually ‘aban-
doned’ and isolated as a result of the deterioration of physical, political and administrative infra-
16  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Development Bank (AfDB), African 
Union Commission (AUC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Assessing progress in Africa 
toward the Millennium Development Goals. MDG Report 2013. Food security in Africa: Issues, challenges and 
lessons,” 2013, pp. 101ff.
17  United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, “Desertification. The invisible frontline,” 
UNCCD, 2014
18  While the number of African migrants has been on the rise, the number of refugees declined substantially 
from the late 1990s, largely due to less frequent coups and violent conflicts (World Bank 2011, p.20). There is a 
more recent report (2013): still the same results?
19  Pankaj Ghemawat, Steven Altman, “DHL Global Connectedness Index 2012. Analyzing global flows 
and their power to increase prosperity,” 2012, p. 37
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structures as well as of their own conscious attempt to stay as far away as possible from the reach 
of weak but predatory states. Many farmers, for example, shifted their production from export 
cash crops to subsistence agriculture. Adding to these long-term domestic dynamics, during the 
post-Cold war 1990s sub-Saharan countries also faced a decline of interest on the part of advanced 
economies, as most evident in the decrease of international aid levels and in the relative disenga-
gement of influential players such as France or the US. As expressed by The Economist in May 2000, 
the continent was perceived and famously portrayed as “hopeless.”
But the seeds of a new trend had been sown already. The beginning of the economic revival, the 
urbanisation fostered by population growth, the introduction and diffusion of mobile and internet 
communication technologies, and the adoption of new, more inclusive and participatory politics 
(based on elections and political party activities as well as on the spread of the free media, par-
ticularly private radios, and civic associations) all favoured a multiplication of individual-level 
exchanges and interactions. Some governments also strived to begin functioning better, and their 
revitalized education policies (notably those aimed at granting universal primary education) or 
taxation efforts (as in some non-oil countries like Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda) helped re-connecting citizens and public apparatuses.20
The diffusion of mobile telephony, which happened unexpectedly fast, has come to play a lar-
gely unforeseen role. It allowed Africans to effectively leapfrog the prior development of landli-
ne networks, which had characterized advanced economies but had proved too expensive and 
problematic south of the Sahara, and opened an amazing range of new possibilities to many of 
them. The staggering progress of mobile phone penetration saw the regional average exceeding 
59 subscriptions per 100 people in 2012, up from just 1 in 199921. While countries such as Ethiopia 
or the Central African Republic retain lower rates of penetration (22-25 per 100 people), in much 
of rural Africa cell phones represented the very first opportunity for telecommunications. The 
impact has been huge. As Aker and Mbiti point out, “across urban–rural and rich–poor divides, 
mobile phones connect individuals to individuals, information, markets, and services. In Mali, 
residents of Timbuktu can call relatives living in the capital city of Bamako – or relatives in France. 
In Ghana, farmers in Tamale are able to send a text message to learn corn and tomato prices in 
Accra, over 400 kilometers away. In Niger, day laborers are able to call acquaintances in Benin to 
find out about job opportunities without making the US$40 trip.”22
The penetration of the internet has been slower and more complex, but it nevertheless increased 
more than tenfold in the past decade, and, thanks to the expansion of mobile-broadband services 
and the related lowering of the costs of access, was expected to reach 16% at the end of 2013. Once 
again, the social and economic potential of digital connections in sectors such as health, education, 
banking, etc. in Africa is very high.23 To better reap the benefits of a digital age, the government of 
Kenya, one of Africa’s best connected countries, invested in the development of a submarine cable 
system to reduce the reliance of internet users on satellite links.
Economic growth with an expanding population also generated new resources and stronger in-
20  African Development Bank, OECD, UNDP, ECA, “African Economic Outlook 2010. Public resource 
mobilization and aid,” OECD Publishing, Paris, 2010
21  World Development Indicators online database, April 2014
22  Jenny Aker, Isaac M. Mbiti, “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 24 (3), 2010, p. 207
23  McKinsey Global Institute, “Lions go digital: the internet’s transformative potential in Africa,” McKinsey 
& Company, 2013
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centives for investments aimed at improving the continent’s ailing infrastructures, not only the 
long-neglected road and railway networks, but also ports, airports or ICT. The African Union 
itself, in 2010, launched an ambitious region-wide Programme for Infrastructure Development in 
Africa. At the same time, Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were revived, from the 
East African Community to ECOWAS, with the aim of raising a historically low level of intra-Afri-
can trade and pushing ahead with deeper economic integration projects, including the prospect 
of closer union among some RECs for establishing an African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) stretching 
from Cape Town to Cairo by 2018. 
Finally, Africa saw an exponential surge of external interest in its mineral and agricultural re-
sources and expanding domestic markets. This contributed to the rapid forging of new internatio-
nal economic and political relationships. While China’s distinct return to the continent dates back 
to the mid-1990s, a range of advanced and emerging economies followed in more recent years, 
including the likes of India, Turkey, Brazil and the Arab states. Aid flows (including those from 
the US) surged and diversified, as did trade volumes and foreign direct investments. China, India, 
Turkey, Russia, France and the US led the way in revamping or expanding the coverage of their 
diplomatic missions and in establishing new forms of economic diplomacy, including the use of 
comprehensive conferences, such as the China-Africa Forum, in which they could work out and 
strengthen their partnerships with African counterparts.
The rise of Nigeria 
Nigeria is fast emerging as Africa’s rising power, challenging the leading role that South Africa 
had played in the region since the mid-1990s. A notoriously complex and fissiparous country, 
Nigeria remains plagued by self-reinforcing predicaments, ranging from widespread poverty and 
youth unemployment to vast corruption and chronic political instability, from religious extremi-
sm to violence. Yet Abuja has two key assets upon which to build its regional primacy, namely 
people and hydrocarbons.
Nigeria is currently home to 169 million inhabitants, far exceeding Ethiopia’s second place (92 
million) on the continent. While, as pointed out, countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia or even 
Uganda are projected to feature massive populations of 200-270 million each by 2100, Nigeria will 
be the largest contributor not only to the region’s but to the world’s demographic increase, with 
almost a billion citizens. Overcoming Indonesia and the US between 2035 and 2045, it will beco-
me the third largest country in the world by population size, behind India (peaking in 2065) and 
China (the slowdown favoured by the one-child policy will lead to a population peak around 2030 
and a subsequent contraction), but the only one of the three still on the rise at the end of the cen-
tury (Figure 7). Tensions and challenges will inevitably derive from this trend. While Nigeria, for 
example, might one day have as many citizens as China, the latter’s land area (9,596,000 sq.km) 
will remain ten times as large as that of the former (924,000 sq.km). The violent Boko Haram insur-
gency in the north points to some of the worst scenarios Nigeria might face when political, social 
and economic tensions are unscrupulously exploited.
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The second, related drive behind Nigeria’s rise is its economic expansion. Abuja’s 7.4% average 
growth rate over the past decade reinforced and stabilized the country’s performance and con-
firmed it as one of the continent’s fastest growing economies. Oil and gas, as pointed out, loom 
large in all this. Yet there is increasingly more than resource wealth to the current trend. This has 
become even clearer since, in early 2014, the estimated size of the Nigerian GDP almost doubled 
to $510bn (2013), an 89% increase on previous estimates due to a technical process of “rebasing”. 
Grounding the new assessment on 2010 as a more recent base year (previous appraisals used 1990) 
allowed not only a better measurement of the size of new industries (the telecoms sector makes 
up almost 25% of the overall increase, but also other industries such as banking and filmmaking 
contribute to the forward jump) and of manufacturing (which sees its share of GDP up from 2% 
to 7%), but also, more generally, the addition of small businesses, including informal shops. With 
oil and gas reduced to 14% of GDP, or half what they were thought to represent, “the new figures 
show that Nigeria is much more than just an oil enclave.”24 
Shooting ahead of South Africa by almost $150bn, Abuja thus adds an economically-leading role 
to its long-standing demographic predominance in the region. Pretoria does retain a much richer 
per capita income and the most modern economy on the continent, producing ten times more 
electric power for a population of less than a third.25 But the recent estimates catapult Nigeria in 
a significantly higher position in international rankings, making it the world’s 24th biggest eco-
nomy, behind Poland and Norway and ahead of Belgium and Taiwan, well in line with the goal 
of becoming part of the 20 largest global economies set out by the government’s Nigeria Vision 
20:2020 (National Planning Commission 2009). And the world is taking notice. The country en-
tered Goldman Sachs’ so-called “Next-11” group of emerging economies as well as Jim O’Neill’s 
24  The Economist, “Nigeria. Africa’s new number one” and “Nigeria’s GDP. Step change,” 12 April 2014, 
pp.12 and 75
25  Africa Confidential, “Buying when there is bood on the streets,” 55, 8, 18 April 2014, www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/5583/Buying_while_there_is_blood_on_the_streets
Figure 7: Population projections (5 most populous countries), 1950-2100
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“MINT” markets (joining Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey). In 2012, economist Ngozi Okonjo-Iwe-
ala’s (Nigeria’s Minister of Finance) bid for the top job at the World Bank was openly backed by 
many influential independent voices, including the Financial Times and The Economist, a further if 
indirect recognition of the country’s growing geo-economic relevance.
Conclusions 
Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing fast economic and social changes that will likely continue over 
the years to come. These processes are potential harbingers of crucial opportunities, but also raise 
several challenges of inescapable concern for the international community as well as for any actors 
specifically involved in the area. 
The nexus between the region’s massive demographic expansion and its recent, rapid economic 
growth is and will be crucial. In principle, the region might be able to take advantage of a 
“demographic dividend”, i.e. the combination of a growing workforce with diminishing 
dependency ratios. But much of this will depend on Africans’ actual capacity to transform what 
has so far largely been jobless growth into more inclusive growth. To the extent that economies on 
the continent will succeed, they will make emerging Africa an area of growing economic relevance, 
prosperity and stability. To the extent that they will not, pressures will become increasingly 
difficult to manage. External migration flows towards advanced economies, for example, may 
rise further, with all their related implications. Domestically, on the other hand, a fast-expanding 
unemployed youth would be more readily available for electoral mobilization and violence, 
as already occurred in such places as Ivory Coast or Liberia. The demographic, economic and 
political trajectory of Nigeria – which has become an economic powerhouse on the continent and 
is bound to become the third most populous country in the world around 2035-2045 – will have 
increasing repercussions for the surrounding region.
Economic expansion also led Africa towards closer economic, political and diplomatic ties with 
a growing number of external actors. Such relationships represent new opportunities – as they 
increase the alternatives available to, and thus the potential autonomy of, Africa’s own fragile 
governments – but they also constitute new interests at play on the continent, many of them 
competing for resources in the area (minerals and land, in particular) and directly interested at 
interfering with Africa’s governments. Land, for example, has increasingly been the object of 
disputes between local populations and foreign interests. Islamic extremism in the Sahel and in 
northern Nigeria, on the other hand, spurred the response of Western powers that are keen to 
promote stability in areas of increasing relevance.
Finally, economic growth will likely have crucial political implications. To the extent that new 
wealth is created and available, African states will have more fiscal resources that will help them 
reduce their chronic fragility. This, in turn, may favour a more complete stabilization of the region. 
We also know from global evidence that higher levels of development – with populations that 
are better educated and increasingly able to satisfy their primary needs – will likely foster further 
democratic progress. In the process, however, African countries will need to be able to govern 
the many transformations they are undergoing – demographic expansion, rapid urbanization, 
expansion of education, agrarian adjustment, enlargement of services and manufacturing, etc. – in 
such a way that such deep changes and transitions do not overly translate into social tensions and 
political instability.
